What Canada’s Bill C-22 Proposes—and Why It Faces Opposition

What is Canada’s Bill C-22?

Bill C-22 is also called the Lawful Access Act. The EFF says it would expand the government’s power to require digital services to help with surveillance. The services could include phone and internet companies, as well as messaging apps. ¹

The EFF reported on October 22, 2026, that the bill had passed the House of Commons and was before the Senate. The sources provided do not say whether its status changed after that date or give a Senate timetable. ¹

The available sources are advocacy commentary, not the bill itself or a full official explanation. They help explain why critics are concerned, but do not provide a complete account of what the law would require.

What would Bill C-22 let the government do?

The EFF says the bill would let the government require digital services to assist with surveillance. It also says the Minister of Public Safety could order a company to make a service accessible to law enforcement, as long as doing so did not cause what the bill calls a “systemic insecurity.” ¹

The sources do not include the relevant bill clauses or explain how this standard would be applied. They also do not describe the checks that would govern such an order. Without those details, it is difficult to assess exactly how broad the power would be.

The EFF says the bill would allow some metadata to be kept for up to a year. Metadata is information about a communication, rather than the message itself. Examples include who contacted whom and when. The campaign site dontsurveil.me also mentions location and device information. ¹²

The sources do not explain which services would have to keep data, exactly what information would be covered, or how authorities could obtain it. Those details are important to understanding the proposal’s practical reach.

Why are people urging Canadians to oppose it?

Critics argue that collecting information about communications could affect people who are not suspected of a crime. The EFF says the proposed retention power could apply broadly. The campaign site says records gathered over time might reveal patterns in someone’s life. These are concerns raised by opponents, not findings established by the sources provided. ¹²

Encryption is another concern. It is a way to scramble information so that only someone with the right key can read it. The EFF warns that requiring a service to provide access could weaken the protections users rely on. ¹

The campaign site says there is disagreement about whether the bill would require breaking end-to-end encryption or create a capability that could lead to that result. It identifies Apple, Signal, and the government as parties to that dispute, but does not include their detailed arguments. The available sources therefore do not settle the question. ²

The EFF says the Canadian Civil Liberties Association is asking Canadians to sign a petition opposing the bill. That is an advocacy effort. The sources do not give a date by which people must act. ¹

Is there a deadline to oppose Bill C-22?

The phrase “running out of time” comes from an advocacy campaign. The EFF’s October 22 post said the bill was before the Senate and that Canadians still had an opportunity to speak out. It did not give a final date for public comments or a scheduled Senate vote. ¹

The sources support saying that opponents were urging people to act while the bill was under consideration. They do not support a specific countdown or a claim that a particular day is the last chance to influence the outcome. As of October 24, 2026, readers should check current Senate information and the bill text for any updates. Those official materials are not included in the sources provided.

What is still unclear about the bill?

The sources describe the main concerns raised by opponents, but they do not provide the full bill, a clause-by-clause explanation, or a detailed government response. They also do not give a full account of the bill’s safeguards or oversight.

Important unanswered questions include which services and records would be covered, what checks would apply to surveillance requests, and how any technical-assistance order could affect encrypted communications. A reliable answer requires the bill text and current official information, alongside arguments from both supporters and critics.